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ABSTRACT 
United States Naval forces conducting straits transits face a host of unique force 
protection challenges. Traffic density is often high, with many ferries, fishing and 
pleasure boats, and large cargo ships maneuvering in a small area. Although the Rules of 
Engagement (ROE) will generally designate query and warning ranges, International law 
and freedom of navigation allow vessels to operate in very close proximity to warships. 
Small vessels are often difficult to regulate and many lack basic equipment such as bridge 
to bridge radios. With a host of stationary and seemingly randomly moving boats, 
determining a hostile action in a timely manner is difficult at best. These conditions make 
the identification of and defense against hostile small craft extremely difficult. Even after 
a craft is designated hostile, the timeline for mounting an effective defense is often very 
short.  
This thesis shows that a gap in capability exists in the surface force to defend 
itself against small threat craft. It adds functionality to the Anti-Terrorism / Force 
Protection (AT/FP) Tool initially developed by Lieutenant James Harney (Harney 2003) 
and significantly enhanced by Lieutenant Patrick Sullivan (Sullivan 2006). Lieutenant 
Harney created the foundation for all the work that followed by investigating the role of 
Discrete Event Simulation (DES) in defense Modeling and Simulation (M&S). The result 
of this work was “a fully integrated, prototypical, Java-based application that 
demonstrates how various Open-Source, web-based technologies can be applied in order 
to provide the tactical operator with tools to aid in Force Protection planning” (Harney 
2003). Following Lieutenant Harney, Lieutenant Sullivan added a great deal of 
functionality to the system by “providing the ability to evaluate security alternatives 
utilizing models of force protection assets, existing naval facilities, and terrorist agents” 
in a 3-D virtual environment with data collection for output analysis (Sullivan 2006).  
My work further expands the simulation’s capabilities by adding the functionality 
to simulate small boat and swarm attacks against underway Arleigh Burke Class Guided 
Missile Destroyers (DDGs) conducting straits transits using variable, realistic Artificial 
 vi
Intelligence (AI). The additional tools were designed specifically to evaluate current 
weapons and tactics by collecting data on saturation of crew-served weapons, 
engagement timelines, and lines of approach. This allows future researchers to evaluate 
the effectiveness of prototype sensors, weapons, and tactics visually or through output 
analysis in order to make more informed decisions regarding systems acquisition or 
doctrinal changes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
I can imagine no more rewarding a career. And any man who may be 
asked in this century what he did to make his life worthwhile, I think can 
respond with a good deal of pride and satisfaction: 'I served in the United 
States Navy.' 
- President John F. Kennedy 
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
U.S. Naval forces conducting straits transits face a host of unique force protection 
challenges. Traffic density is often high, with many ferries, fishing and pleasure boats, 
and large cargo ships maneuvering in a small area. Although the Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) will generally designate query and warning ranges, International law and freedom 
of navigation allow vessels to operate in very close proximity to warships. Small vessels 
are often difficult to regulate and many lack basic equipment such as bridge to bridge 
radios. With a host of stationary and seemingly randomly moving boats, determining a 
hostile action in a timely manner is difficult at best. These conditions make the 
identification of and defense against hostile small craft extremely difficult. Even after a 
craft is designated hostile the timeline for mounting an effective defense is often very 
short.  
This thesis adds functionality to the Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection (AT/FP) 
Tool initially developed by Lieutenant James Harney (Harney 2003) and significantly 
enhanced by Lieutenant Patrick Sullivan (Sullivan 2006). Lieutenant Harney created the 
foundation for all the work that followed by investigating the role of Discrete Event 
Simulation (DES) in defense Modeling and Simulation (M&S). The result of this work 
was “a fully integrated, prototypical, Java-based application that demonstrates how 
various Open-Source, web-based technologies can be applied in order to provide the 
tactical operator with tools to aid in Force Protection planning” (Harney 2003). 
Following Lieutenant Harney, Lieutenant Sullivan added a great deal of functionality to 
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the system by “providing the ability to evaluate security alternatives utilizing models of 
force protection assets, existing naval facilities, and terrorist agents” in a 3-D virtual 
environment with data collection for output analysis (Sullivan 2006).  
This thesis further expands the simulation’s capabilities by adding functionality to 
simulate small boat and swarm attacks against underway Arleigh Burke Class Guided 
Missile Destroyers (DDGs) conducting straits transits using variable, realistic Artificial 
Intelligence (AI). The additional tools were designed specifically to evaluate current 
weapons and tactics by collecting data on saturation of crew-served weapons, 
engagement timelines, and lines of approach. This allows future researchers to evaluate 
the effectiveness of prototype sensors, weapons, and tactics visually or through output 
analysis in order to make more informed decisions regarding systems acquisition or 
doctrinal changes. 
B. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 
As a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer, I have served two afloat tours. The first 
was on an Arleigh Burke Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG), and the second was an afloat 
Command Staff. During both tours I had the opportunity to see how Crew Served 
Weapons operated, how training was conducted, how the chain of command was set up, 
and the tactics we and others employed for combating small boat and swarm attacks.  
One of the most startling examples of effective swarm tactics that I have ever seen 
occurred during a Midshipmen tour with the Norwegian Navy. I was stationed for a 
month on a Norwegian fast patrol boat. During a NATO exercise, the Norwegians 
positioned 24 such patrol boats, each equipped with two torpedoes, just behind a series of 
rocky outcroppings on the coast of Norway. From this vantage point we stood on the top 
of the patrol boat’s pilot house and watched for the masts of passing NATO ships. When 
an American aircraft carrier came into view, the order was given for all 24 patrol boats to 
launch a simultaneous attack. All boats headed straight for the carrier at a flank bell and 
when within range, all fired both simulated torpedoes. The patrol boats then immediately 
turned and ran back to the fjords and safety. The NATO forces’ radars were unable to 
detect any of the patrol boats mixed in with the jagged rocks and they had no warning of 
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the coming attack. The attack was so fierce and quickly executed that the NATO forces 
had almost no chance to mount an effective defense and the majority of the torpedoes 
were reported as hits by the exercise proctors.  
One other event worth noting took place during my tour on the DDG. We 
received a distress call from a burning vessel and responded. When we arrived on the 
scene, a small sport fishing vessel was ablaze and two men were a short distance away in 
a life raft. The men were brought aboard via one of our Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats 
(RHIB) where they were met by our Commanding Officer (CO). After a failed attempt to 
extinguish the fire using shipboard fire hoses, the CO informed the owner that we were 
required to sink the vessel as it posed an uncharted hazard to navigation and the owner 
agreed. We then manned up all of our Crew Served Weapons (CSW) on one side of the 
ship, including the 25mm chain gun and .50 cal mounts and began to fire on the boat. 
Despite numerous direct hits the boat showed no signs of sinking and not wanting to 
waste ammunition the CO ordered the gunners to stand down. The vessel eventually 
burned to the waterline and sank.  
On both occasions I realized that I had just witnessed a significant event take 
place, and those experiences were some of the driving forces behind my involvement in 
this thesis. In neither case can I assign any blame to any personnel or equipment failures. 
The outcomes were derived not by the fault of anyone or anything. Personnel followed 
orders, sensors and weapons worked correctly, but we are ill prepared and ill equipped to 
deal with small boat and swarm threats.  
C. OVERVIEW 
The vulnerability of U.S. warships conducting straits transits has long been a 
concern for the United States Navy. Restrictions in the ROE as well as requirements 
imposed by innocent and transit passage allow potential adversaries unique opportunities 
to test both our engagement criteria and capabilities. On January 6, 2008, this was 
demonstrated in the Straits of Hormuz when a group of suspected Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) vessels approached and harassed the USS Port Royal (CG 
73), USS Hopper (DDG 70) and USS Ingraham (FFG 61) as they transited the straits. 
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The small boats made high speed approaches, attempted to interfere with navigation, and 
discarded boxes into the water in front of the warships. Additionally, verbal threats were 
received over the bridge to bridge radio that may have originated from a shore based 
transmitter. This example clearly demonstrates the challenges facing Commanders in 
these situations. Ultimately no shots were fired and the situation ended peacefully, but 
not before getting the attention of the highest levels of the U.S. government. 
 
Figure 1.   Image of suspected IRCGN vessels in Straits of Hormuz Jan 6 2008 (from 
http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=54340) 
While this scenario demonstrates some of the problems associated with force 
protection, it is far from a worst case scenario. In this case the vessels were marked as 
IRGCN and were using bridge to bridge radios. A far more complex situation would 
involve unmarked craft or craft that appear to be fishing or pleasure boats that do not 
respond on bridge to bridge. The fact that any vessel has the potential to be a threat 
makes identifying an adversary the equivalent not to finding a needle in a haystack, but 
rather to finding one specific needle in a stack of needles.  
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D. CHALLENGES 
In order to understand the challenges to force protection in straits transits it is 
important to first understand the physical constraints placed on a vessel conducting such 
a transit. Many straits commonly navigated by U.S. warships are less than ten nautical 
miles wide. Assuming that the channel or traffic separation scheme is in the center or 
near the center of this waterway means that land is less than five nautical miles from 
either side of the ship. Even more restrictive is the fact that a good portion of the strait 
may not have sufficient draft so as to be navigable to larger vessels and the navigable 
waters are often broken up into traffic separation schemes. Close proximity to land also 
interferes with both surface and air search radars as the surface picture suffers from false 
echoes from land based structures and air radars must be either attenuated or turned off 
altogether in order not to interfere with ground based electronics. 
Straits are often strategically important because they serve as hubs for commercial 
traffic. This traffic may include tankers, large merchant ships, ferries, fishing, and 
maintenance vessels and civilian pleasure craft. High surface traffic density makes 
identification and tracking of individual craft very difficult. While U.S. Sailors are 
trained in the U.S. Coast Guard’s Rules of the Road (Coast Guard 2005), merchant 
traffic, and to a greater extent civilians, routinely ignore these regulations. This makes 
predicting the actions of another vessel difficult and further complicates distinguishing 
hostile intent or action. Table 1 describes some of the world’s busiest oil relevant straits 
in terms of traffic, geographic restrictions, and past problems. 
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Figure 2.   Important World Oil Transit Chokepoints (from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html) 
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The number one enemy to a Commander attempting to protect his ship against 
small boat attack is time. It is central to the problem because many factors compress 
reaction times in these situations. Among these factors are physical speed, geographic 
separation, identification, and maneuverability. Current doctrine for straits transits 
generally dictates that the faster a strait transit can be accomplished the better. 
Unfortunately when dealing with small craft, this may equate to closure rates in excess of 
50kts or 84.47 Feet per Second. Assuming that an unmarked vessel loitered in traffic until 
it was 500 feet from a U.S. warship before accelerating towards the ship at max speed the 
small boat would reach the ship in 5.91 seconds.  
As mentioned earlier, identification of threats prior to the onset of hostile action is 
nearly impossible. The attack on the USS Cole in Aden Harbor, Yemen on October 12, 
2000 demonstrates this point (CRS 2001). Unmarked vessels conducting what amounts to 
maritime guerilla warfare render whole suites of sophisticated sensors irrelevant. In 
congested waterways the normal markers for hostile intent (closure rate, erratic 
maneuvering, proximity, etc) are also negated as chaotic traffic is constantly moving in 
multiple directions. Maintaining Situational Awareness (SA) is a problem for both bridge 
watch standers and the personnel manning the Combat Information Center (CIC) as the 
number, type, and intent of surface vessels quickly becomes overwhelming.  
Adding to the confusion and stress inherent in straits transits is the issue of limited 
maneuverability. The current practice of high speed transits coupled with narrow 
waterways means that only small rudder adjustments are possible and warships are 
extremely limited in their ability to execute evasive maneuvers or maneuver to unmask 
batteries. Even in the best of situations where the only concern is safe navigation, 
maintaining a safe distance from neutral shipping is often problematic.  
E. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this thesis is to identify current gaps in force protection against 
small boat attack during swarm attacks. This will be accomplished by conducting 
unclassified simulations examining current doctrine against multiple types of enemy 
tactics, examining current training methodology and equipment, and researching possible 
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systems, techniques, and equipment to enhance our future capabilities. Simulation tools 
developed at NPS will be used to run a series of visual simulations with output data 
analysis.  
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II consists of literature review and current methodology for training and 
equipment. This chapter explores how the U.S. Navy trains at sea personnel, as well as 
the capabilities and limitations of current crew-served weapons. Additionally, Chapter II 
explores possible future training systems. Chapter III gives examples of previous related 
work and will go step by step through the software used to develop and run the scenario. 
Each piece of software will be described ensuring a baseline understanding of how the 
simulation was created. Chapter IV describes the modeling approach with respect to 
behaviors of simulated entities and creation of the test scenario. Chapter V contains detail 















II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I have spread the mantle of my nation over the ocean, and will guard her 
forever. I am her heritage, and yours. I am the American Sailor. 
-Anon 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers current weapons employed onboard U.S. naval warships, in 
particular those onboard the Arleigh Burke Class Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG), as 
well as current training methods as prescribed by the Surface Force Training Manual 
(DON 2007). Additionally, some metrics for small boat threat craft and corvettes will be 
included. Of particular relevance is the lack of any qualification for an underway vessel 
to repel a coordinated small boat attack. Additionally, the only live fire exercises 
prescribed for afloat units involve firing either at stationary targets at a range or firing on 
floating targets at sea. As noted below, there are requirements to repel a small boat at a 
pier and at anchor. However, the methodology for the set up and conduct of these 
qualifications are sparsely documented. This is due to the fact that to date, no training 
system exists to adequately train for these scenarios.  
B. SURFACE FORCE TRAINING MANUAL 
1. Reporting Tools and Requirements  
Commander Naval Surface Forces (COMNAVSURFOR) instruction 3502.1D 
Surface Warfare Training Manual (SURFORTRAMAN) released July 1, 2007 is the 
current U.S. fleet standard for the training and qualification of surface vessels and crews. 
This instruction details the requirements for surface force qualification and certification 
in all warfare areas, force protection, and damage control. Most notable regarding 
revision D to this instruction is the introduction of the SHIPTRAIN methodology for 
training and readiness. SHIPTRAIN effectively removes the previous method of having 
cyclic standard training for ships crews by shore based agencies such as Afloat Training 
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Groups (ATG). Instead, ships complete an initial series of certifications after which, they 
self report and self assess and request augmented training as required (DON 2007). This 
greatly increases the burden on ships training teams to not only train effectively, but also 
to honestly report degradation in mission areas to organizations outside of the command. 
Figure 3 illustrates the SHIPTRAIN cycle of training, assessing, and reporting.  
 
 
Figure 3.   SHIPTRAIN training and reporting cycle. (DON 2007) 
 
The SHIPTRAIN method was introduced in response to the fleet’s adoption of the 
Fleet Response Program (FRP) designed to create a more responsive, flexible, force that 
is ready to deploy far more often than under the previous 18 month training cycle. Along 
with SHIPTRAIN, the current SURFORTRAMAN mandates the use of two new systems 
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to the fleet: the Training and Operational Readiness Information Services (TORIS) and 
the Training Figure of Merit (TFOM). TORIS is a new electronic reporting system used 
by force commanders to have a quick reference overview of an individual unit’s current 
status with regards to readiness and capabilities. TORIS reports are generated using a 
series of TFOM reports. TFOM is a metric for evaluating how a unit is performing in a 
specific mission area or on a specific training exercise or event. Ship’s training officers 
receive reports from shipboard training teams evaluating performance and report these 
using TORIS.   
2.  Antiterrorism and Force Protection Qualifications 
Tab C of the SURFORTRAMAN delineates the requirements for AT/FP 
qualification at the unit level. Within this section, the only mention of small boat defense 
comes in the form of the tenth Continuous Certification Requirement (CCR). The current 
fleet standard for certifying this CCR is essentially a communications and FPCON drill. 
A watch stander in a training environment is approached by a proctor and shown a photo 
of a small boat and told that it is approaching the ship. From that point, the watch stander 
talks his or her way through the appropriate FP measure but never touches a weapon. 
While knowing the appropriate steps, in the event of an emergency, is indeed important it 
does not train the watch stander to functionally and physically engage a target. Training 
to repel a small boat attack with a photo and verbal commands is akin to expecting 
someone to swim during a crisis when their only training has been in a classroom. There 
are certain skills that require a hands-on approach to successfully master.  Note the safety 
section below the chart in Figure 4 that mandates that all small arms will be replicas and 




Figure 4.   SURFORTRAMAN Tab C – ATFP requirements for small boat attack 
(DON 2007) 
3. Additional AT/FP Resources 
The major document at the disposal of Commanders for force protection guidance 
is the Antiterrorism Force Protection for Naval Operations Commander’s Guide Rev A 
released July 2003 from the office of the Director of AT/FP (N34) Admiral Eric Olsen. 
While not an instruction per se, this guide is listed as a “pocket guide that consolidates in 
a single reference a wide assortment of relevant AT/FP information relating to both afloat 
and ashore assets (ATFP 2003). The ATFP Guide does little to address training issues but 
goes into great detail regarding threat levels, appropriate responses, and classifications. 
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The AT/FP Commander’s Guide charges Commanders with providing security for forces 
and DoD assets as well as providing training and education to personnel charged with 
that protection. (ATFP 2003) Figure 5 is an illustration of Force Protection Conditions 
(FPCON) based on threat. 
 
Figure 5.   Force Protection Condition (FPCON) summary (ATFP 2003). 
C. CREW SERVED WEAPONS QUALIFICATIONS 
1. Small Arms Qualification 
The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 3591.1E 
issued 20 February 2007 is the current fleet standard for small arms qualifications of U.S. 
naval personnel. This instruction breaks qualification into four categories. Category I sets 
the standards for personnel carrying weapons for personal protection. Category II, which 
is most applicable here, sets the standards for personnel armed for the purpose of 
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defending DOD property as part of a watch. Category III sets the standards for personnel 
carrying firearms while operating in support of or directly with expeditionary ground 
forces. Category IV sets the standards for qualification of personnel operating in a 
mission specific status such as Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams.  
OPNAVINST 3591.1E outlines the specific criteria for all personnel assigned to a 
training role with Crew Served Weapons (CSW). Specifically, any personnel assigned to 
CSW training positions must complete the USMC CSWI course or other DoD equivalent 
crew served weapons instructor course with a minimum cycle of two years (Small Arms 
2007). This course of instruction differs from the small arms instructor requirements and 
does not allow personnel to instruct on the use pistols, rifles, or other small arms unless 
specifically qualified on those weapons as well. This instruction also directs that the 
student-instructor ratio for CSW shall be no more than 1 to 1. (Small Arms 2007) The 
category II qualification specifications are outlined in the “qualification criteria for light, 
medium and heavy machine gun performance evaluation” and are required to be 
completed by personnel at an interval of no more that 8 months. (Small Arms 2007) 
Detailed requirements for both the light and heavy machine gun course of fire for 
qualification can be found in OPNAVINST 3591.1E but both qualifications consist of 6 
phases. Figures 6 and 7 are summaries of the requirements for the light and heavy 








Figure 7.   Summary table for heavy machine gun qualification. (Small Arms 2007) 
 
In the event that a 400 meter range is not available or training is occurring at sea, 
an 8ft by 8ft target often referred to as a “killer tomato” is authorized as an acceptable 
range substitute (Small Arms 2007). In both cases, time requirements are the sole 
objective criteria for qualification. Target acquisition and weapons effects on target are 
graded by the CSW instructor and may be deemed satisfactory so long as the student does 
not violate any of the range safety parameters dictated in the range safety section of the 
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instruction. In every case, the target is either stationary (range) or nearly stationary (killer 
tomato).  In addition to the above qualification criteria, drills for Crisis Action Team 
(CAT) members are delineated in Annex A of the instruction. These drills consist mainly 
of weapons familiarization exercises although they do cover some of the more tactical 
aspects of watch standing such as scan patterns for target acquisition. 
2. Current at Sea Trainers 
Current at sea training devices are limited to a handful of approved items. Two of 
these are the “killer tomato” and the Robo-ski. The killer tomato is an inflatable orange 
cube that is deployed from the flight deck or missile deck of a destroyer. Once deployed 
the ship steams away from the float until it reaches an approximate range of 400 yards. 
Once that range is reached, the ship comes to all stop and CSW operators are allowed to 
complete range qualifications in accordance with the standards set forth in OPNAVINST 
3591.1E. Not only does a killer tomato bear no resemblance to almost any other object 
that would normally be seen at sea, but its nearly stationary position does little to nothing 
to train CSW personnel to be able to engage inbound threat craft. Adequate as it may be 
for basic weapon proficiency and familiarization training a more suitable training system 
must be implemented in the fleet for FIAC and swarm defense training.  
 
Figure 8.   A “killer tomato” deployed at sea for CSW training. 
The Navy has attempted to bridge the training gap by investing in multiple 
systems such as the Robo-ski jet ski, Sea Fox Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV), and 
modified Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBS) with mixed results. Robo-ski is an 
 18
unmanned modified jet ski that may operate alone or in groups. Unfortunately, due to 
price and availability, these USVs are not currently directly engaged. Instead, towed 
drones are fired upon and due to the constraints of not hitting the USV, realistic threat 
profiles cannot be achieved.  
3. The Missing Piece 
In none of the aforementioned guides or instructions is there a concrete method 
for evaluating crew served personnel effectiveness against threat craft. There are many 
reasons for this omission. Chief among them is the inherent complexity of evaluating 
crews against actual targets. The only current measure of effectiveness would involve 
using actual ammunition on representative threat craft operating in realistic ways. Clearly 
this would require a phenomenal allocation of funds to evaluate the numerous AT/FP 
crews in the multiple fleets. Additionally, a method for steering these vessels would be 
required. Finally, there are environmental concerns when conducting such an exercise. 
Firing live ammunition into actual craft would result in the spillage of gallons of fuel and 
oil for every evolution.   
As it stands, the requirement for proficiency for a light machine gunner, heavy 
machine gunner, or CSW operator is a meager 100 rounds of live ammo fired once every 
8 months against stationary targets. The only criteria for satisfactory certification are a 
time constraint for reloading and the proctor’s opinion of the operator’s performance. 
This is insufficient preparation to counter the emerging threat of FIAC in the heavily 
trafficked littorals in which we frequently operate.  
A press release written by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Mark 
Logico dated June 6, 2007 and released by Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command/Commander, U.S. 5th Fleet Public Affairs Office shows the Navy’s attempts 
to close this training gap with existing technology. The full press release is available at 
5th Fleet’s webpage (http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2007/128.html). The Stennis 
battle group chose to train for FIAC attacks during a straits transit in order to evaluate 
and increase FP capabilities. Participating in the exercise were USS John C. Stennis 
(CVN 74), USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), USS Antietam (CG 54), USS O'Kane 
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(DDG 77), USS Denver (LPD 9) and USS Rushmore (LSD 47). The Stennis used 
Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC)s as mock FIAC vessels that attempted to penetrate 
and attack the formation as it conducted a straits transit. According to Cmdr. James 
Rentfrow, USS Stennis’ combat direction center officer “The exercise tests the strike 
group’s ability as a whole to defend itself against small boat attacks. What made this 
exercise unique was that we used LCACs from the Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary 
Strike Group to simulate the small boats attacking.” As engaging and new as this training 
may have been, it essentially did what all other current training methods do and that is to 
stress communications vice CSW capabilities to repel or sink threat craft. “The biggest 
challenge and reason why we practice this is to perfect our communications, as we have a 
lot of different elements working together to protect the strike group,” said Rentfrow.  
D. CREW SERVED WEAPONS 
The standard weapons employed for self defense on DDGs are the 7.62mm M-60, 
the Browning .50 caliber machine gun, and the Mark 38 - 25 mm machine gun system. A 
recent addition to the fleet is the dual .50 cal mount allowing a single gunner to operate 
two weapons simultaneously as seen in Figure 9. Table 1 contains the parameters for the 
three main CSWs in operation in the fleet.  The standard configuration for an Arleigh 
Burke DDG is 2 25mm chain guns on the port and starboard amidships, 2 M-60s on the 
port and starboard bridge wings, and up to 8 .50 caliber weapons arrayed from fore to aft.  
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M60 2 7.62mm 550 / Min 3,725 m 1,100 m 
M2 4 .50 Cal 450–600 / Min  4.4 Miles 2,000 m 
Mk 38 2 25 mm 175 / Min 1 Nm 6,800 m 
 
Table 1.   Parameters for common crew served weapons. 
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E. FUTURE SYSTEMS 
1. Augmented Reality 
In the context of this thesis, Augmented Reality (AR) will refer to the 
combination of the real world with some artificiality injected. Simply put, it is in the 
same vein as the first down line seen superimposed onto the field during National 
Football League games. AR systems are often used to enhance the information perceived 
by the viewer. It is this aspect of AR systems that fit the training needs of the Navy very 
well. The use of an AR system for FP training would allow CSW operators the 
opportunity to train in more places and in a manner far superior to current methods. One 
system developed by Lieutenant Nathan Conger at the Naval Postgraduate School could 
significantly improve waterfront training for FIAC and swarm attacks.   
2. Augmented Reality Virtual At Sea Trainer (AR-VAST) 
Although still a prototype, the AR-VAST developed by LT. Nate Conger stands 
to significantly improve watch stander proficiency though the use of real world weapons 
firing blanks at injected virtual targets (Conger 2008). The current version of AR-VAST 
uses a monitor for display and only displays a single threat boat. Ideally, the AR-VAST 
system would be a portable system that could be used with existing gun mounts that 
would allow CSW personnel to look out onto any harbor and see real world geography 
with synthetic attack craft. By tracking the position of the CSW, the system would use 
real world physics to display outbound tracer rounds, damage to FIAC craft, and 
occlusion due to real world objects such as buoys or other piers. This would allow 
training to take place in any port, at any time with weapons effects and individual CSW 
performance being central to the exercise. Instead of a communications drill, of which 
there are already plenty, AR-VAST would evaluate watch standers ability to do what 
really matters: fire at and destroy threat craft. Not only would this be a leap forward for 
real world proficiency but it would allow training to take place in locations where it had 
previously been impossible while truly testing marksmanship skills all for very little 
money. Figure 10 depicts a conceptual AR-VAST engagement.  
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Figure 10.   AR-VAST conceptual image showing synthetic tracers and FIAC vessels. 
3. General Dynamics XM307 
The XM 307 is a next generation CSW contracted by the U.S. Army to replace 
aging heavy machine guns and grenade launchers. It fires 25mm airburst projectiles up to 
2000 yards at a rate of 250 rounds per minute (GD 2005). A system such as this could 
prove extremely effective at stopping small boats at short range as it integrates the rate of 
fire and range of a machine gun with the stopping power of a grenade launcher. It is 
meant to be 2 man portable weighing in at 50lbs and can be operated with a mount. The 
Navy needs to assess whether this weapon would be a good replacement for, or addition 
to, its current CSW arsenal. The advantage of a low altitude airburst weapon is that it is 
not designed to punch small holes in strong armor in the manner that current CSWs do. 
Hitting a small craft with a fragmentation type munition would be far more effective as 
there are multiple possible neutralization opportunities that are not taken advantage of by 
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solid rounds. A single airburst over a small craft has the potential of disabling the three 
major components of a small craft: its driver, its engine, and its overall seaworthiness.  
 
 




The U.S. Navy must keep up with emerging threats and technology. The .50 cal, 
while an excellent weapon in its own right is over 50 years old. The addition of the dual 
.50 cal mounts to the fleet is a step in the right direction, but it alone is not sufficient. 
Current training requirements for CSW gunners are a mere 100 rounds every 8 months 
and even then the targets do not challenge the gunner’s ability to track and repeatedly hit 
a moving target. The force protection drills in use are essentially communications drills 
rather than tools to measure gunner proficiency. There are many reasons for these 
training gaps and the Navy must look to modeling and simulation to fill these gaps. 
Finally, new weapons systems such as the XM307 must be evaluated for suitability of use 
in the fleet.  
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III. SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
Since 9-11 the mind set is totally different. We need to deploy, we need to 
live overseas, we need to be engaged. We can't just sit at home and tuck 
our tails in and hide. 
 - Rear Adm. James Kelly 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the modeling and simulation (M&S) tools used to create and 
run the model for this thesis. Each tool used will be briefly described and its use 
explained. These include Java, the Netbeans IDE, Simkit, Viskit, X3D, the Savage 3D 
model archives, the Savage Force Protection Simulation, and Vivaty beta. Additionally, a 
short description of the background and implementation of Discrete Event Simulation 
(DES) is included. While this chapter gives the reader a basic understanding of the 
applications and uses of the various software and techniques, it is by no means intended 
as a stand alone tutorial.  
B. SCENARIO GENERATION TOOLS 
1. Java 
Java is a free, open source High Level Language (HLL) designed to work on 
multiple operating systems. Java is an object oriented language where users write source 
code with a .java extension which a Java compilers then turns that code into a .class file 
for running on a Java Virtual Machine (Java VM). These .class files are not native to a 
particular operating system but rather are intermediate code designed specifically to work 





Figure 12.   Overview of Java program development (Zakhour 2006) 
The Java VM works in concert with a Java Application Programming Interface 
(API) in order to run Java code on a multitude of hardware platforms. Along with the 
basic functionality of running Java programs, many APIs share the following minimum 
features: development tools, user interface toolkits, usually consisting of a Graphics User 
Interface (GUI) and Java documentation libraries consisting of term definitions and uses 
(Zakhour 2006).  
2. The NetBeans IDE 
The NetBeans IDE is a free, open source GUI that allows users to create and run 
Java files in the form of projects. It requires a Java Development Kit (JDK) and Java 
Runtime Environment (JRE) to function correctly. Once installed and opened, users are 
greeted with a welcome splash page and given the option to create a new NetBeans 






Figure 13.   NetBeans IDE generating new “Hello World” Application 
(Zakhour 2006) 
Once a project is created, users establish a source package that will contain all of 
the source files needed to run that project. The source files are the user authored .java 
files that are compiled by the IDE in order to form the .class files. Additionally, libraries 
and test packages in the form of .jar files may be imported into the project in order to test 
functionality or to expand on standard Java commands. Libraries allow for expanded 
functionality for specific Java application types. Often, these files will support fully 
functional programs that run in a Java environment, such as Viskit. Test packages are 
used to support debugging or as a means of data input to an application. These packages 
could include background information such as map data.  After file creation is completed, 
applications can be run from the NetBeans console by using the “build” and “run” 










Figure 14.   Example source code generation using NetBeans for the “Hello World” 
application (Zakhour 2006) 
3. Discrete Event Simulation 
In a traditional time step simulation, an event can only occur at a set interval. The 
problem with this method is that exactly when something occurred can never be 
ascertained. Only the time step at which that event was registered is known. Unless an 
event occurs exactly at a time step, then the report of that event will always be late. 
Traditionally this is countered by determining what threshold is acceptable for latency of 
reports. The problem with this approach is that every entity in the simulation that can 
possibly experience a state change must be evaluated at every time step. Simulations that 
have a small number of states, or entities that can experience change and simulations that 
have large time steps, can often overcome these issues. However, if the accuracy of time 
reporting is very important or the number of entities or states is very large, the 
computational complexity of these simulations grows exponentially and can become a 
major problem.  
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Discrete Event Simulation (DES) is a method of creating and running simulations 
that do not use time steps as event triggers. DES only update when an event occurs. In 
other words, a simulation involving the detection of an aircraft will not require its states 
to be recomputed until the aircraft reaches the sensor threshold. This makes DES 
computationally lean and fast. It also means that the time reported for a given event is 
exactly when that event occurred, not the nearest later time step. This causes these 
simulations to be extremely accurate with respect to time step. DES accomplishes this 
through the use of event lists. These lists consist of upcoming events that are pre-
calculated and are removed once they occur. Figure 15 shows a sample event list for the 
arrival process application. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Graph depicting event list for a DES simulation (Kelton 2008) 
 
One of the simplest examples of a DES is the simple arrival process. The java 
application Arrival Process is one of the most basic examples of a DES. The application 
simulates the arrival of entities for use in any number of larger simulations. It could be 
used for example to simulate and estimate the number of CSW stations needed based on 
the time taken to engage multiple targets. Note that the arrival times in Figure 16 are 
constrained only by the mathematic discrepancies inherent in the calculation of floating 
point numbers rather than based on a time step length. The four columns of the figure 
represent from left to right: simulation time, the event list, number of arrivals, and events 
that have already occurred. The event list used here was for a simulation that lasted for 15 
seconds yet only had five events including the run event. If this same simulation was run 
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in a traditional time step simulation using a 1 second time step 16 calculations would 
have had to be done to accomplish this same output and the closest any event would have 
been to exactly when that event occurred would have been .33 seconds. If a .5 second 
time step had been used 31 calculations would have occurred and the closest would have 
still been .125 seconds off of the correct event time. This clearly demonstrates the 
superiority in both accuracy and computational complexity in DES.  
 
 
Figure 16.   Sample graph depicting arrivals and departures to the arrival process 
application  
4. Event Graphs and Simkit 
Simkit is an open source java API designed to implement event graph 
methodology for DES. The event graph approach to simulation design uses visual 
representations of code using a specific set of object types and connections (Schruben 
1983). Specifically, events are represented as circles connected to one another with lines 
called scheduling edges. Theses lines represent one event triggering another. Lines may 
also pass information from one event to another, represented by a square below the line 
with some parameter contained in it. Finally, a scheduling edge may contain a constraint 
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for one event to trigger another. These constraints are resented by a “S” or “(“ shaped line 
crossing a line. Events which self trigger have lines arcing out and returning to the same 
event as shown in Figure 16. Just as the lines previously mentioned, these self-triggering 
lines may contain constraints or information. The “tA” shown in Figure 17 on both of the 
scheduling edges are the delay times for the events to trigger again. These can be set to 
any number of distributions such as exponential or fixed intervals.  
 
Figure 17.   Example event graph depicting the Arrival Process code (Buss 2001) 
To use Simkit in Java, begin by navigating a web browser to 
http://diana.cs.nps.navy.mil/simkit/, and download the latest version of the software 
(1.3.7 as of 08 Sept 08). Once the software is downloaded, the Simkit .jar files need to be 
added to the NetBeans project space or whichever IDE project space is being used.  
 
 
Figure 18.   Location of Simkit actions.jar and simkit.jar files in NetBeans IDE 
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Once installed, the Simkit .jar files will allow Simkit code to be accessed and run 
using your IDE. The specific items contained in these files are the function calls and 
libraries used by Simkit. Example code using Simkit and the NetBeans API can be found 
in Appendix A.  
The beauty of using Simkit, and the event graph approach to simulation creation, 
is that it allows complex processes to be broken down into events, state variables, and 
parameters. Events are elements that have set times, cause state changes, and are 
controlled by parameters. State variables are pieces of information that may change over 
time as a result of events being triggered. Parameters are constants such as delays or the 
number of items in a simulation such as servers. Using these three building blocks, 
extremely complicated relationships can be built, piece by piece, in an easily 
understandable diagram. Unlike raw code, anyone familiar with event diagrams can look 
at someone else’s work and quickly understand the meaning and workings of a 
simulation design. In this sense, non-code savvy individuals can construct event graphs 
that can be turned over to coders, who can convert the intent of the event graph into raw 
code. An example of this is seen in Figure 19 showing a process with two types of 
service.  Viskit will convert event graphs into Java source code automatically. 
 
Figure 19.   Simkit event graph depicting two types of service (Kelton 2008) 
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5. Diskit 
Diskit expands on Simkit functionality by modeling situations in three 
dimensions. This functionality allows for more detailed sensor-detection simulations and 
also for the transfer of data from simulation to simulation via the Distributed Interactive 
Simulation (DIS) standard. The DIS standard was adopted by the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in 1995 in order to “define an infrastructure for linking 
simulations of various types at multiple locations to create realistic, complex, virtual 
worlds for the simulation of highly interactive activities” (IEEE 1995). The adaptation of 
Simkit to be DIS compliant was significant as it allowed Simkit to be used either directly 
or indirectly with all future DIS compliant systems. Figure 20 shows how the DIS 
standard applies across the 7-layer network architecture model.  
 
 
Figure 20.   IEEE DIS requirements (IEEE 1995) 
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6. Viskit 
Viskit is a Java API for the construction of Simkit projects in a visual format. This 
is useful as it removes the restriction on end users to be proficient in java. So long as the 
user has an understanding of event graphs and some familiarity with Simkit, complex 
event graphs can be generated by the average user. Once event graphs are generated 
using Viskit, the underlying Java code is automatically generated by the system. The 
combination of Simkit, Viskit, and Diskit formed the bedrock of the Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and background parameters for my simulation. Figure 21 shows an 
example screen from Viskit showing the interconnections of events within the 
Antiterrorism / Force Protection (AT/FP) simulation in Savage Studios. 
 
Figure 21.   Example event graph for the pier object in Viskit API 
7. X3D Edit 
Extensible 3D Graphics (X3D) Edit is a well documented, open source scene 
authoring tool that “uses a scene graph to model the many nodes that make up a virtual 
environment” (Brutzman 2007). That scene graph is the ISO standard X3D. In this 
context, a scene graph is a series of interconnected sets of values that represent color, 
size, location, and many other physical features as well as sensors, sounds, and 
animation. This is done using a parent-child relationship where nested objects may inherit 
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aspects of the parent node. The “scene” element contains all of the physical 
characteristics for a given scene. Below the scene node, transforms set offset locations for 
shape nodes. The shape nodes contain all of the geometric information for a given object. 
Figure 22 shows an X3D authored screen shot showing the scene graph, complete with 
indexed face sets, color values, and location data under the root elements. Figure 23 
shows the same .x3d file being displayed in the X3D viewer. 
 




Figure 23.   Model using above scene graph viewed in X3D viewer. 
8. Savage Force Protection Simulation 
The Savage Force Protection Simulation was a project undertaken by LT Pat 
Sullivan (Sullivan 2006) based on the ground breaking work of LT James Harney 
(Harney 2003). LT Harney did the background research for the creation of a simulation 
engine such as ease of use, layout, design, and eventually moved into the functionality of 
an actual force protection simulation. His work in 2003 resulted in a simulation engine 
that could be tailored to different ports, ship classes, and behaviors and would give 
analysis output after scenario runs. Figure 24 is a screen capture of LT Harney’s 
simulation demonstrating the pre-run setup of threat boat characteristics. 
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Figure 24.   Example of simulation developed by LT Harney. (Harney 2003) 
 
Following LT Harney’s work, LT Pat Sullivan added functionality to the 
simulation in 2006 resulting in the Savage Force Protection Simulation. Sullivan’s work 
centered on giving force protection decision makers the ability to evaluate both tactics 
and equipment with real world parameters in real world ports. He developed numerous 
event graphs to control agent behavior to include friendly, neutral, and hostile agents as 
well as utilities such as map and pier data. Figure 25 is an example of Sullivan’s event 
graph for the friendly patrol boat agent representing the AI for the Rigid Hull Inflatable 




Figure 25.   Friendly Patrol Boat event graph (Sullivan 2006) 
9. Vivaty Studios (Beta) 
Vivaty Studios (Beta) is an open source scene authoring tool available at 
http://www.vivaty.com/downloads/studio/ with native X3D support. Vivaty acts much 
like other 3D modeling tools by allowing the user to import a number of open standards 
extension types and to manipulate a host of variables. Vivaty allows for quick and easy 
modification of .wrl or .x3d file types and for the construction of multiple layer 3D 
scenes such as the ones used in this work. Figure 26 shows the display of a model 
imported from a .x3d file type.  
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Figure 26.   Imported X3D Model displayed in Vivaty application. 
C. SUMMARY 
Each tool described in this chapter is a building block that allows the scenario to 
be created. It was intended to demonstrate how complex simulations can be created using 
a series of easy to use tools. It was this method of starting with the simple, testing it, and 
implementing it that allowed this work to be done. The short descriptions are not meant 
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IV. BEHAVIOR MODELING AND SCENARIO SETUP 
Buying the right computer and getting it to work properly is no more 
complicated than building a nuclear reactor from wristwatch parts in a 
darkened room using only your teeth. 
- Author Dave Barry 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the assumptions used for simulation setup as well as a 
detailed description of how the simulation was designed. Special attention is paid to the 
interaction of the map data and the agents using that information as well as the 
parameters used to direct the abilities and actions of the agents.  
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Environmental Variables 
The environmental conditions for this scenario are as follows: 
• Visibility – Unlimited (10Nm) 
• Sea State – 1 (0-3ft seas) 
• Wind - mild (0-10kts) 
• Tide – Slack water (0kts current) 
• Water depth – As per NOAA charted data for Indian Island 
2. Behavior 
The behavior for the threat craft was broken into three distinct types. All 
behaviors were controlled using the Diskit java class “TACTIC.” The tactic class 
contains four distinct behavior modes: Attack, Distraction, Surveillance, and Diversion. 
All of the behaviors were chosen because they were representative of possible real world 
scenarios. The first threat behavior is a direct attack. In this mode, threat craft move en 
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mass from the point of origin directly towards the DDG and attack as soon as they enter 
the attack range. This was done using the “Attack” profile in Diskit. The second behavior 
was a diversion by one or more of the threat craft and an attack by others. This was set up 
using the “Diversion” tactic along with the “Attack” tactic. In this setup, threat craft will 
harass but not attack the DDG in order to draw attention away from the threat craft 
conducting the actual attack. The final threat behavior was a distributed attack following 
threat craft loitering throughout the map and switching tactics to attack when an order 
was sent from the terrorist cell planner agent. Figures 27 and 28 are the conceptual design 
for own ship behavior and conceptual design for threat behavior, respectively. 
 
Figure 27.   Conceptual design for own ship behavior 
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Weapons effects are not be modeled for the purposes of this simulation. This is 
done for two reasons. First, weapons effects are not modeled in order to maintain an 
overall unclassified classification of this work. However, the framework for the inclusion 
of real world weapons parameters is included allowing for future work to model and 
analyze these effects under a different classification. The second reason for discarding 
weapons effects is that this work is more concerned with ranges, threat classification, and 
the detect to engage timeline.   
Chief among the assumptions for weapons exclusions in this simulation is the 
exclusion of the 5″ main battery of the DDG-51 class ship. This weapon was removed 
from the options as its range of 12.6 nautical miles creates a potential for rounds to reach 
sovereign soil of foreign countries in areas where the straits were less than 10 miles 
across (Jane’s 2007). Additionally, the 5″ gun requires either a fire solution provided by 
the AEGIS weapons system or a visual solution using the optic scope. In a high contact 
density environment where threat craft may need to be assessed by actions alone, a robust 
radar picture does not aid in self defense. Additionally the identification of hostile intent 
or hostile action will often occur within the minimum firing range of the 5″ gun. For 
these reasons, it will not be modeled in this simulation.  
The second assumption for weapon exclusion is the removal of the Close In 
Weapons System (CIWS) Block 1B gun mount. While this mount is designed to operate 
in a surface mode, it is not typically installed on DDG-51 class destroyers. For this 
reason, it will not be modeled in this simulation. 
4. Radar 
Both surface search and air search radars were disregarded in the simulation as 
the surface search radar adds nothing of value to the watch standers in this scenario. The 
determination of hostile action and/or hostile intent cannot be discerned from a radar 
picture in this environment as the standard measures for threat assessment such as speed, 
angle of approach, and location are not sufficient to determine intent when surrounded by 
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contacts in a strait. While it is possible that watch standers could be alerted by fast 
moving inbound contacts, it has very little effect on the detect to engage sequence since 
the approaching vessels may legally operate at fast speeds and move towards the DDG. 
Additionally, loitering threat craft would offer no information with regard to intent until 
they launched an attack which could be from a very close range. For these reasons, the 
only detection sensor available to either the threat craft or to the DDG is a visual sensor 
with a range of 8000 yards.   
C. SIMULATION SETUP 
1. Location 
The chosen location for the scenario is the area around Indian Island in 
Washington State. This map was chosen as it has many of the elements critical to analysis 
of force protection in a channel. The map is large enough to allow for significant time to 
pass, it contains a chokepoint, and has many options for the starting and ending points for 
all agents. Figure 29 shows a representative map with red boxes indicating the areas used 
for the A* search algorithm for path planning and the green boxes outlining the areas of 
navigable water.  
The map is broken up into parent and child relationships for route planning 
purposes. For each zone represented by a red box in Figure 28, every other zone that was 
reachable was considered a child. Initially, the map contained some drawbacks in that not 
all of the zones were connected in both directions. In other words, if zone “A” had zone 
“B” as a child, then zone “B” should have zone “A” as a child as well. This two way 
relationship allowed the route planner to determine how vessels could reach their 
destinations, if at all. However, some of the child-parent relationships were initially one 
way. This was corrected by editing the Nautical Chart object in the Viskit assembly 
editor. Within the Nautical Chart, the viskit.AStarZoneGeometry item contained the field 




relationships and all red arrows represent one-way connections. All of the one way 
connections were corrected allowing for complete A* path planning from any point on 
the map to any other through the correct intermediate zones.  
 
 
Figure 29.   Indian Island map showing starting areas and navigation restrictions 
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2. Path Planning 
All movement is directed via an A* search algorithm. Movement speeds are 
variables set in the object inspector section of the assembly in Viskit. The parameters 
here were “close enough” approximations in order to maintain an unclassified overall 
rating. These variables could easily be set to real world specifications for classified 
simulations in future work. A 28 knot cruising speed was used for the DDG as a 
representative speed used during the transit of a foreign strait. The threat attack craft have 
speeds varying from 0-25 knots and the ferries and sailboats 0-15 knots. Threat small 
boats will use maximum speed once a target is spotted in all cases. Figure 30 shows the 
section of Viskit where physical parameters can be modified. 
 
Figure 30.   Dynamic physical constraints screen from Viskit showing the movement 
parameters for the DDG 
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Threat craft always launch from one of the green boxes considered navigable 
water in the simulation. One they initialize, the threat craft use the “Closest Zone” 
method shown in Figure 31 to determine the nearest zone for A* path planning. Once the 
system compares the vessel’s location with the center of all zones, it chooses the nearest 
one and begins comparing the children in order to generate the optimal path to the 
destination zone. Once that path is determined, a move order is generated that 
commences threat craft movement through the scene.  
 
 




All of the models used are located in the Savage 3D Model Archive 
(https://savage.nps.edu/Savage/). The primary models used were the Arleigh Burke high 
detail prototype, sail boat under sail, and the speed boat with driver as the threat craft. 
The DDG prototype was modified using the weapons coverage model and the U.S. 
Marine avatar as the CWS operator. Figure 32 shows the model as it appeared in the 
simulation complete with CSW watch standers and weapons arcs of fire. This was 
accomplished by editing the IndianIslandSwarmDIS.x3d file as show in Figure 33 and 
adding prototypes to the base model. 
 
 




Figure 33.   IndianIslandSwarmDIS.x3d file showing the addition of marine watch 
standers and weapons coverage prototypes. 
4. Event Graphs and Assembly Code 
The event graphs driving the simulation consist of seven distinct entities. The 
Nautical Chart event graph contains all of the information regarding the navigable water 
and zones needed for the A*. Upon instantiation, the Nautical Chart generates all of the 
AStarZoneGeometry needed by the rest of the simulation for movement and path 
planning purposes. The applicable agents have a listener event that allows the individual 
agents to determine how and where to move. The Scenario Manager is essentially the 
mediator for the entire simulation. It contains the master run and initialization events as 
well as the parameters for stop time and stop conditions.  
The Terrorist Cell Planner event graph is the Command and Control (C2) behind 
the threat craft and dictates starting positions, ending positions, tactics, and start times. 
This allows for complex behavior since the planner can order different movers to operate 
in different ways. In this manner, vessels can loiter, distract, or launch an attack at any 
time in the simulation. Finally, the cell planner tells the attackers what their target is and 
where geographically they are allowed to engage that target. The Explosive Laden Vessel 
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event graph takes in the nautical chart information and uses it to execute the movement 
orders from the cell planner. Once the operating criteria are dictated the craft become 
autonomous unless additional or contradictory orders are received. The threat craft use an 
intercept algorithm which once a target is detected and the solution, if one exists, from 
that algorithm become the course and speed that the threat craft will use. Threat boats 
also report attack attempts and results back to the cell planner.  
The Civilian Pleasure Craft event graph creates a neutral vessel behavior that can 
be directed to randomly traverse the map or to move in a repeating path like a ferry. The 
pleasure craft have only a visual sensor for detection and in this case the range of that 
sensor was reduced to 200 yards in order to recreate situations where pleasure craft are 
not following the accepted rules of the road or are not paying attention to other vessels.  
The Pier event graph is a holdover from Pat Sullivan’s work and while not 
necessary for this simulation, it was not removed for the benefit of future projects. The 
pier exists only as a physical barrier to movement, a collision detection object, and as a 
communications hub if used. The Military Ship Transiting event graph is similar to the 
explosive laden vessel event graph with some exceptions. The military ship has an event 
that evaluates a detected contact to attempt to classify the contact as friend, neutral, or 
threat. Additionally, the military ship has a radio communication event that can be used 
to send and receive messages or issue queries and warnings. Figure 34 shows all the 
event graphs used. 
 52
 
Figure 34.   Viskit event graph editor showing all of the event graphs used in the 
simulation. 
 
The assembly is an XML file that ties all of the event graphs together and 
delineates the relationships between all of the elements in the scene. All connections are 
listeners that allow the different event graphs to “hear” and respond appropriately to other 
event graph triggers. Note that the explosive laden vessels listen to both the planner and 
the scenario manager. This is because they require both physical and geographical 
information from the scenario manager as well as tactical and path information from the 
cell planner. All other movers listen to the scenario manager only and the nautical chart 
listens to nothing, but contributes all of the physical information to the rest of the 




Figure 35.   Indian Island swarm assembly file showing interconnections between 
event graph representations. 
5. Scene Setup 
Two scenes were created for analysis. In both cases, the DDG begins its transit in 
the area denoted by the green circle in Figure 36 and begins transiting south. In the first 
scenario, the threat craft launch from the southern most corner of the map and 
immediately begin to transit north. This was accomplished by hard coding the starting 
point of the small boats to correspond to the Mutiny Bay waterway. Neither the small 
boats nor the DDG have any initial information regarding each other and rely on a visual 
sensor in order to detect each other. In the second scene, the small boat starting location 
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is randomized by removing the Mutiny Bay restriction in the “Select Start Area” event in 
the terrorist cell planner event graph.  Figure 37 is a screen capture from the simulation 
showing the DDG transiting with the terrorists visible on the horizon. Figure 38 shows 
the terrorists traveling in a loose formation towards the DDG. 
 
 
Figure 36.   Indian Island map showing the starting locations of the DDG (green) and 




Figure 37.   Screen capture showing DDG traversing towards threat craft. Various 
engagement zones are depicted by the different color range rings. 
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Figure 38.   Screen capture showing threat craft moving towards DDG. Note the use of 
unit symbology. 
D. SUMMARY 
The combination of event graphs used in the simulation allowed for a robust 
model capable of analyzing a wide range of data. The addition of real world parameters, 
weapons capabilities, and tactics will enable decision makers to evaluate new tactics, 
weapons, sensors, and ROE in a classified simulation. This model can be adapted easily 
to evaluate formation steaming, path planning in a dense environment, or any number of 
other situations.    
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V.  ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the outcome of scenario generation, the original intent of my 
work, and what I was actually able to accomplish. While the background research yielded 
gaps in training and aged weapons systems designed for use by land forces, the 
simulation did not reach full capability during the allotted period.  
B. SIMULATION ASSESSMENT 
1. The Positives 
The Savage Force Protection simulation tool is a tailorable, scalable, and realistic 
simulation authoring application. An extraordinary amount of work has gone into 
developing the underlying Diskit, Viskit, and Java files as well as the GUI. With training, 
a competent analyst can create almost any realistic scenario. Using the embedded 
parameter menus, future sensors, weapons, ships, and tactics can be analyzed. The 
scenarios can be run in any location for which bathymetric data and digital images are 
available. Complex AI can be created easily using the menus within the terrorist cell 
planner and explosive laden vessel event graphs. Ships of any class can be introduced 
easily into a scene since it uses open source file extensions such as X3D. Modifying 
models is as easy as editing X3D files to include or remove watch standers, weapons, and 
graphics while physical parameters can all be modified from within Viskit. In addition to 
the vast number of models available in the Savage 3D Model Archive and the behaviors 
already implemented in Viskit, brand new models and behaviors can be developed by 
making new Viskit event graphs. Tutorials for almost every skill required to author a 
scene in Savage Studio are available from websites such as Sun Microsystems and NPS. 
This simulation will continue to evolve and would be greatly beneficial to anyone 
modeling and analyzing maritime scenarios. 
 58
2. The Issues 
Due to unidentified bugs, I was unable to run a complete simulation. There 
appears to be a problem with the A* path finding algorithm. When the DDG was placed 
in the scene between Admiralty Inlet North and Admiralty Bay it would correctly identify 
Admiralty Bay as the nearest zone. However, when the DDG traversed to Admiralty Bay 
it incorrectly identified the children and, instead of continuing on to Admiralty Inlet 
South, it entered an infinite loop and attempted to reach its current destination over and 
over again causing the simulation to crash with a result of never reaching the termination 
point in the run. Figure 39 shows what the Admiralty Bay children should be. Figure 40 
shows the path developed by the A* algorithm as displayed in the output window in 
Viskit. 
 




Figure 40.   Viskit output window showing looping logic attempting to path find from 
Admiralty Bay. 
A possible reason for this erroneous logic may be a statement in the A* search 
Java file that will not allow path finding if the next zone is considered a “dead end.” A 
dead end is described in the code as a zone that contains no children or the child is the 
zone that the mover currently occupies. This should not be a restriction now that the 
nautical chart’s parent-children relationships have been corrected to reflect two way 
movements. Figure 41 shows the “Dead End” code from the AStarSearch.java file 
located in the Diskit source code. It is this definition of dead end that may be causing the 
incorrect route planning. Follow-on work will be needed to confirm this suspicion and to 




Figure 41.   Code block from AStarSearch.java showing the dead end computations 
(Sullivan 2006). 
When the DDG was hard coded to traverse the map directly to Admiralty Inlet 
South, another apparent bug surfaced. The code was modified to clear the A* zone list 
and then the destination zone was appended as the sole element in the list. When this was 
done the DDG traversed smoothly across the map with no looping logic. However, once 
that addition to the code was added, all of the threat craft initialized at a point well above 
the horizon. As the DDG transited the map, the threat craft remained clustered together in 
the sky. Modifications to the start zone in an attempt to hard code a starting zone failed to 
fix this error. I believe that there is a fault in a transform that is switching the –Z and Y 
axis but I have been unable to find it.  
C. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Training 
Current training is insufficient because it does not address or assess a CSW 
gunner’s ability to actually hit and disable a moving target. An assessment of the current 
standards for proficiency needs to be completed in order to ascertain whether 100 rounds 
of live fire every 8 months is sufficient to maintain proficiency in actual firing operations. 
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Current force protection requirements do not address realistic swarm training. Current 
force protection qualifications focus on protection in port and on boarding teams. 
Conclusion: A gap in training exists.  
A proposed means of closing the current training gap is to develop and field 
augmented reality trainers such as AR-VAST. Additionally, smaller less expensive 
remote control targets could be used in the interim to improve CSW operator proficiency. 
One such target could be off the shelf remote controlled model boats. Many are 2-3 feet 
long and move at speeds in excess of 20 miles an hour. Since these remote control boats 
are designed to be used in close proximity of other remote controlled boats, de-
conflicting radio channels for multiple boats would be simple. At prices as low as $40-50 
a piece; crews could routinely fire on and destroy these boats. Given their small size and 
speed, these would prove to be very challenging targets for CSW operators and would no 
doubt create competition among gunners.  
2. Current Weapons 
Current fleet weapons are aging and were not initially designed to operate at sea. 
These are weapons developed for the army to counter human and lightly armored targets. 
They were not designed to stop or destroy boats made of wood or fiberglass. Punching a 
number of holes in a vehicle may be very effective in disabling it, but doing the same 
thing to an inherently buoyant object is far less useful. This leaves it up to the gunners to 
be skilled enough to hit either an engine or the driver in order to halt inbound craft. 
Conclusion: A gap in technology exists.  
Proposed solutions to the current gap in technology are to employ, or at a 
minimum, investigate new systems such as General Dynamics XM307. A more 
immediate option is the use of incendiary rounds for current CSWs. While putting holes 
in a wooden boat may not be terribly effective, setting it on fire would be very 
detrimental to its operation. Additionally, in the event that a small boat was loaded with 
explosives or munitions incendiary rounds may prove extremely effective. 
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D. GOALS AND ACTUAL OUTCOMES 
The following were my goals at the outset of this thesis. Many of the incomplete 
sections are also recommendations for future work. 
• Analyze current training (complete) 
• Assess if a training gap exists (complete) 
• Analyze current weapons (complete) 
• Assess if a technology gap exists (complete) 
• Generate a swarm based scene for use in Savage Studio (complete) 
• Run scenario and collect data on saturation of CSW gunners (incomplete) 
• Collect data on detect to engage sequence (incomplete) 





VI.  RECOMMENDED FUTURE WORK 
The following items are identified as future work. 
1.  Savage Studio Force Protection Tool 
The most important work that needs to be done is within the underlying code of 
the Savage Studio Force Protection simulation. The Savage Force Protection tool requires 
grooming in order to reach its full potential. Its outstanding potential is currently 
hampered by code problems that prevent it from operating correctly. The scale of this is 
quite large and I recommend it be left to professionals.  
2. Work Within the Current Model 
There are still numerous improvements that can be made to the current scenario. 
Making each watch stander on the DDG an independent sensor and adding line of sight 
from deck gunners to the target would vastly improve the output and aid in more detailed 
analysis. The communications messages from the DDG should be changed to reflect 
contact reports. A new event graph for threat assessment (using visual sensor and threat 
parameters) can be developed for more realistic classification by the DDG of visually 
acquired contacts. This would involve coding up a set of logic based on what does and 
does not constitute a threat and a human decision making study would be extremely 
useful in creating this logic. A simple but effective change would be to add more traffic 
to the scene. Currently there are only two sailboats and no ferries or other surface traffic. 
This is not necessarily representative of real world situations. Finally, a night time transit 
simulation is needed. However, the majority of previously mentioned items should be 
completed first. 
3. Data Collection and Studies 
There is a great deal of data that needs to be collected to improve future 
simulations and a number of studies that need to be conducted to aid in understanding the 
overall problem. Of extreme value would be a study evaluating CSW gunner’s abilities to 
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engage moving targets. Additionally, work needs to continue on the AR-VAST system. 
Suitability studies need to be conducted on new systems such as the XM307 to evaluate 
whether they would make good additions to the current inventory or even replace older 
systems. Real world metrics need to be collected on current weapons so that accurate 
damage modeling can be accomplished. Finally, this information needs to be used to 
construct a classified scenario using real world data.  
4.  Investigation of Cost Effective Interim Solutions 
All of the recommended work and changes will take time. However, the threat 
exists. For this reason, we must investigate novel solutions such as remote controlled 
speed boats, to increase training effectiveness until permanent solutions are found. 
Although the idea of firing CSWs at remote controlled speed boats may sound trivial, the 
ability to actually engage and destroy inexpensive small targets could greatly improve 
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